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Abstract
In the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001)
it is of basic importance to construct an explicit strategy weakly forcing the strong
law of large numbers (SLLN) in the bounded forecasting game. We present a simple
finite-memory strategy based on the past average of Reality’s moves, which weakly
forces the strong law of large numbers with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n).
Our proof is very simple compared to a corresponding measure-theoretic result of
Azuma (1967) on bounded martingale differences and this illustrates effectiveness
of game-theoretic approach. We also discuss one-sided protocols and extension of
results to linear protocols in general dimension.
Keywords and phrases: Azuma-Hoeffding-Bennett inequality, capital process, game-
theoretic probability, large deviation.
1 Introduction
The book by Shafer and Vovk (2001) established the whole new field of game-theoretic
probability and finance. Their framework provides an attractive alternative foundation of
probability theory. Compared to the conventional measure theoretic probability, the game
theoretic probability treats the sets of measure zero in a very explicit way when proving
various probabilistic laws, such as the strong law of large numbers. In a game-theoretic
proof, we can explicitly describe the behavior of the paths on a set of measure zero,
whereas in measure-theoretic proofs the sets of measure zero are often simply ignored.
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This feature of game-theoretic probability is well illustrated in the explicit construction
of Skeptic’s strategy forcing SLLN in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001).
However the strategy given in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), which we call
a mixture ǫ-strategy in this paper, is not yet satisfactory, in the sense that it requires
combination of infinite number of “accounts” and it needs to keep all the past moves of
Reality in memory. We summarize their construction in Appendix in a somewhat more
general form than in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001). In fact in Section 3.5 of their
book, Shafer and Vovk pose the question of required memory for strategies forcing SLLN.
In this paper we prove that a very simple single strategy, based only on the past
average of Reality’s moves is weakly forcing SLLN. Furthermore it weakly forces SLLN
with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n). In this sense, our result is a substantial
improvement over the mixture ǫ-strategy of Shafer and Vovk. Since ǫ-strategies are used as
essential building blocks for the “defensive forecasting” ([11]), the performance of defensive
forecasting might be improved by incorporating our simple strategy.
Our thinking was very much influenced by the detailed analysis by Takeuchi ([9] and
Chapter 5 of [8]) of the optimum strategy of Skeptic in the games, which are favorable
for Skeptic. We should also mention that the intuition behind our strategy is already
discussed several times throughout the book by Shafer and Vovk (see e.g. Section 5.2).
Our contribution is in proving that the strategy based on the past average of Reality’s
moves is actually weakly forcing SLLN.
In this paper we only consider weakly forcing by a strategy. A strategy weakly forcing
an event E can be transformed to a strategy forcing E as in Lemma 3.1 of Shafer and
Vovk (2001). We do not present anything new for this step of the argument.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the bounded
forecasting game and motivate the strategy based on the past average of Reality’s moves
as an approximately optimum ǫ-strategy. In Section 3 we prove that our strategy is
weakly forcing SLLN with the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n). In Section 4 we consider
one-sided protocol and prove that one-sided version of our strategy weakly forces one-
sided SLLN with the same order. In Section 5 we treat a multivariate extension to linear
protocols. In Appendix we give a summary of the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of
Shafer and Vovk (2001).
2 Approximately optimum single ǫ-strategy for the
bounded forecasting game
Consider the bounded forecasting game in Section 3.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001).
Bounded Forecasting Game
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
2
Reality announces xn ∈ [−1, 1].
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
For a fixed ǫ, |ǫ| < 1, the ǫ-strategy sets Mn = ǫKn−1. Under this strategy Skeptic’s
capital process Kn is written as Kn =
∏n
i=1(1 + ǫxi) or
logKn =
n∑
i=1
log(1 + ǫxi).
For sufficiently small |ǫ|, logKn is approximated as
logKn ≃ ǫ
n∑
i=1
xi − 1
2
ǫ2
n∑
i=1
x2i .
The right-hand side is maximized by taking
ǫ =
∑n
i=1 xi∑n
i=1 x
2
i
.
In particular in the fair-coin game, where xn is restricted as xn = ±1, approximately
optimum ǫ is given as
ǫ = x¯n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi.
Actually, as shown by Takeuchi ([9]), it is easy to check that ǫ = x¯n exactly maximizes∏n
i=1(1+ǫxi) for the case of the fair-coin game. Recently Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi
(2005) [5] give a detailed analysis of Bayesian strategies for the biased-coin games, which
include the strategy ǫ = x¯n as a special case.
Of course, the above approximately optimum ǫ is chosen in hindsight, i.e., we can
choose optimum ǫ after seeing the moves x1, . . . , xn. However it suggests to choose Mn
based on the past average x¯n−1 of Reality’s moves. Therefore consider a strategy P = Pc
Mn = cx¯n−1Kn−1. (1)
In the next section we prove that for 0 < c ≤ 1/2 this strategy is weakly forcing SLLN.
The restriction 0 < c ≤ 1/2 is just for convenience for the proof and in Kumon, Takemura
and Takeuchi (2005) we consider c = 1 for biased-coin games.
Compared to a single fixed ǫ-strategyMn = ǫKn−1 or the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter
3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), letting ǫ = cx¯n−1 depend on x¯n−1 seems to be reasonable
from the viewpoint of effectiveness of Skeptic’s strategy. The basic reason is that as x¯n−1
deviates more from the origin, Skeptic should try to exploit this bias in Reality’s moves by
betting a larger amount. Clearly this reasoning is shaky because for each round Skeptic
has to move first and Reality can decide her move after seeing Skeptic’s move. However
in the next section we show that the strategy in (1) is indeed weakly forcing SLLN with
the convergence rate of O(
√
logn/n).
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3 Weakly forcing SLLN by past averages
In this section we prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1 In the bounded forecasting game, if Skeptic uses the strategy (1) with
0 < c ≤ 1/2, then lim supnKn = ∞ for each path ξ = x1x2 . . . of Reality’s moves
such that
lim sup
n
√
n|x¯n|√
log n
> 1. (2)
This theorem states that the strategy (1) weakly forces that x¯n converges to 0 with
the convergence rate of O(
√
log n/n). Therefore it is much stronger than the mixture
ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), which only forces convergence to 0.
A corresponding measure theoretic result was stated in Theorem 1 of Azuma (1967) as
discussed in Remark 3.1 at the end of this section. The rest of this section is devoted to
a proof of Theorem 3.1.
By comparing 1, 1/2, 1/3, . . . , and the integral of 1/x we have
log(n+ 1) =
∫ n+1
1
1
x
dx ≤ 1 + 1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1
n
≤ 1 +
∫ n
1
1
x
dx = 1 + logn.
Next, by summing up the term
1
(k − 1)k =
1
k − 1 −
1
k
from k = i to n, we have
n∑
k=i
1
(k − 1)k =
1
i− 1 −
1
n
(3)
or
1
i− 1 =
n∑
k=i
1
(k − 1)k +
1
n
.
Now consider the sum
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i =
n∑
i=2
1
(i− 1)i(x1 + · · ·+ xi)
2. (4)
When we expand the right-hand side, the coefficient of the term xjxk, j < k, is given by
2×
(
1
(k − 1)k +
1
k(k + 1)
+ · · ·+ 1
(n− 1)n
)
= 2×
(
1
k − 1 −
1
n
)
.
We now consider the coefficient of x2j . In (4) we have the sum from i = 2 and we need to
treat x1 separately. The coefficient of x
2
1 is 1− 1/n from (3). For j ≥ 2, the coefficient of
4
x2j is given by 1/(j − 1)− 1/n, as in the case of the cross terms. Therefore
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i = 2
∑
1≤j<i≤n
( 1
i− 1 −
1
n
)
xjxi +
(
1− 1
n
)
x21 +
n∑
i=2
( 1
i− 1 −
1
n
)
x2i
= 2
∑
1≤j<i≤n
1
i− 1xjxi −
2
n
∑
1≤j<i≤n
xjxi + x
2
1 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i
= 2
n∑
i=2
x¯i−1xi − nx¯2n + x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i . (5)
Write x¯0 = 0. Then the first sum on the right-hand side can be written from i = 1. Under
this notational convention (5) is rewritten as
n∑
i=1
x¯i−1xi =
1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i +
n
2
x¯2n −
1
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i
)
. (6)
Now the capital process Kn = KPn of (1) is written as
Kn =
n∏
i=1
(1 + cx¯i−1xi).
As in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we use
log(1 + t) ≥ t− t2, |t| ≤ 1/2.
Then for 0 < c ≤ 1/2 we have
logKn =
n∑
i=1
log(1 + cx¯i−1xi)
≥ c
n∑
i=1
x¯i−1xi − c2
n∑
i=1
x¯2i−1x
2
i ,
and under the restriction |xn| ≤ 1, ∀n, we can further bound logKn from below as
logKn ≥ c
n∑
i=1
x¯i−1xi − c2
n∑
i=1
x¯2i−1. (7)
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By considering the restriction |xn| ≤ 1, (6) is bounded from below as
n∑
i=1
x¯i−1xi ≥ 1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i +
n
2
x¯2n −
1
2
(
1 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1
)
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i +
n
2
x¯2n −
1
2
(2 + log(n− 1))
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=2
x¯2i +
n
2
x¯2n −
1
2
(2 + log(n− 1))
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=1
x¯2i +
n
2
x¯2n −
1
2
(3 + log(n− 1)).
Since c ≤ 1/2, substituting this into (7) yields
logKn ≥ c
(1
2
− c
) n∑
i=1
x¯2i−1 + c
n
2
x¯2n −
c
2
(3 + log(n− 1))
≥ cn
2
x¯2n −
c
2
(3 + log(n− 1))
≥ c
2
(nx¯2n − logn)−
3
2
c
=
c
2
log n
(
nx¯2n
logn
− 1
)
− 3
2
c.
Now if lim supn
√
n|x¯n|/
√
log n > 1, then lim supn logKn = +∞ because log n ↑ ∞.
This proves the theorem.
Remark 3.1 In the framework of the conventional measure theoretic probability, a strong
law of large numbers analogous to Theorem 3.1 can be proved using Azuma-Hoeffding-
Bennett inequality (Appendix A.7 of Vovk, Gammerman and Shafer (2005), Section 2.4
of Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), Azuma (1967), Hoeffding (1963), Bennett (1962)). Let
X1, X2, . . . be a sequence of martingale differences such that |Xn| ≤ 1, ∀n. Then for any
ǫ > 0
P (|X¯n| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp(−nǫ2/2).
Fix an arbitrary α > 1/2. Then for any ǫ > 0
∑
n
P (|X¯n| ≥ ǫ(log n)α/
√
n) ≤
∑
n
exp(−ǫ
2
2
(log n)2α) <∞.
Therefore by Borel-Cantelli
√
n|X¯n|/(logn)α → 0 almost surely. Actually Theorem 1 of
Azuma (1967) states the following stronger result
lim sup
n→∞
√
nx¯n√
log n
≤
√
2 a.s. (8)
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Although our Theorem 3.1 is better in the constant factor of
√
2, Azuma’s result (8) and
our result (2) are virtually the same. However we want to emphasize that our game
theoretic proof requires much less mathematical background than the measure theoretic
proof. Also see the factor of
√
3/2 in the one-sided version of our result in Theorem 4.1
below.
4 One-sided protocol
In this section we consider one-sided bounded forecasting game where Mn is restricted to
be nonnegative (Mn ≥ 0), i.e. Skeptic is only allowed to buy tickets. We also consider the
restriction Mn ≤ 0. In Chapter 3 of Shaver and Vovk, weak forcing of SLLN is proved by
combining positive and negative one-sided strategies, whereas in the previous section we
proved that a single strategy P = Pc weakly forces SLLN. Therefore it is of interest to
investigate whether one-sided version of our strategy weakly forces one-sided SLLN. We
adopt the same notations as Section 5 of Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (2005), where
one-sided protocols for biased-coin games are studied.
For the positive one-sided case consider the strategy P+ with
Mn = cx¯
+
n−1Kn−1, x¯+n−1 = max(x¯n−1, 0).
Similarly we consider negative one-sided strategy P− with Mn = −cx¯−n−1Kn−1, x¯−n−1 =
max(−x¯n−1, 0).
For these protocols we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 If Skeptic uses the strategy P+ with 0 < c ≤ 1/2, then lim supnKn = ∞
for each path ξ = x1x2 . . . of Reality’s moves such that
lim sup
n
√
nx¯n√
log n
>
√
3
2
.
Similarly if Skeptic uses the strategy P− with 0 < c ≤ 1/2, then lim supnKn =∞ for each
path ξ = x1x2 . . . of Reality’s moves such that lim infn
√
nx¯n/
√
log n < −
√
3/2.
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of this theorem for P+. If x¯n is eventually
all nonnegative, then the behavior of the capital process KPn and KP+n are asymptotically
equivalent except for a constant factor reflecting some initial segment of Reality’s path
ξ. Then the theorem follows from Theorem 3.1. On the other hand if x¯n is eventually
negative, then KP+n stays constant and Theorem 4.1 holds trivially. Therefore we only
need to consider the case that x¯n changes sign infinitely often. Note that at time n when
x¯n changes the sign, the overshoot is bounded as
|x¯n| ≤ 1/n.
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We consider capital process after a sufficiently large time n0 such that x¯n0 ≃ 0, and
proceed to divide the sequence {x¯n} into the following two types of blocks. For n0 ≤ k ≤
l − 1, consider a block {k, . . . , l − 1}. We call it a nonnegative block if
x¯k−1 < 0, x¯k ≥ 0, x¯k+1 ≥ 0, . . . , x¯l−1 ≥ 0, x¯l < 0.
Similarly we call it a negative block if
x¯k−1 ≥ 0, x¯k < 0, x¯k+1 < 0, . . . , x¯l−1 < 0, x¯l ≥ 0.
By definition, negative and nonnegative blocks are alternating.
For a nonnegative block
KP+l = KP
+
k
l∏
i=k+1
(1 + cx¯i−1xi) (9)
whereas for a negative block KP+l = KP+k . Taking the logarithm of (9) we have
logKP+l − logKP
+
k =
l∑
i=k+1
log(1 + cx¯i−1xi)
≥ c
l∑
i=k+1
x¯i−1xi − c2
l∑
i=k+1
x¯2i−1x
2
i
≥ c
l∑
i=k+1
x¯i−1xi − c2
l∑
i=k+1
x¯2i−1.
From (6) it follows
l∑
i=k+1
x¯i−1xi =
1
2
l∑
i=k+1
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i +
l
2
x¯2l −
k
2
x¯2k −
1
2
l∑
i=k+1
1
i− 1x
2
i
≥ 1
2
l∑
i=k+1
i
i− 1 x¯
2
i −
1
2k
− 1
2
(
1
k
+ log
l
k
)
.
In the above, we used the approximation formula
1
m
+
1
m+ 1
+ · · ·+ 1
n
≤
∫ n
m
dx
x
+
1
m
= log
n
m
+
1
m
.
Thus we obtain
logKP+l − logKP
+
k ≥ −
c
k
− c
2
log
l
k
. (10)
Now starting at n0, we consider adding the right-hand side of (10) for nonnegative
blocks and 0 = logKP+l − logKP
+
k for negative blocks. Then after passing sufficiently
8
many blocks, logKP+l − logKP
+
k behave as (10) during half number of the entire blocks.
Therefore at the beginning nk of the last nonnegative block, we have
logKP+nk − logKP
+
n0
≥ − c
2
log
nk
n0
− c
4
log
nk
n0
+ o(1) = −3c
4
log
nk
n0
+ o(1). (11)
To finish the proof of Theorem 4.1, let n be in a middle of the last nonnegative block
{nk, . . . nl−1}. Then as above, we have
logKP+n − logKP
+
nk
≥ cn
2
x¯2n −
c
nk
− c
2
log
n
nk
. (12)
Adding (11) and (12) we have
logKP+n − logKP
+
n0
≥ cn
2
x¯2n −
c
2
logn− c
4
lognk +
3c
4
log n0 + o(1).
Noting that nk = O(n), we derive
logKP+n ≥
cn
2
x¯2n −
3c
4
logn +O(1) =
c
2
log n
(
nx¯2n
log n
− 3
2
)
+O(1).
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5 Multivariate linear protocol
In this section we generalize Theorem 3.1 to multivariate linear protocols. See Section 3
of Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura and Shafer (2005) [12] and Section 6 of Takemura and
Suzuki (2005) [7] for discussions of linear protocols. Since the following generalization
works for any dimension, including the case of infinite dimension, we assume that Skeptic
and Reality choose elements from a Hilbert space H . The inner product of x, y ∈ H is
denoted by x · y and the norm of x ∈ H denoted by ‖x‖ = (x · x)1/2. Actually we do not
specifically use properties of infinite dimensional space and readers may just think of H
as a finite dimensional Euclidean space Rm. For example spectral resolution below just
corresponds to the spectral decomposition of a nonnegative definite matrix.
Let X ⊂ H denote the move space of Reality, and assume that X is bounded. Then
by rescaling we can say without loss of generality that X is contained in the unit ball
X ⊂ {x ∈ H | ‖x‖ ≤ 1}.
In this case the closed convex hull co(X ) of X is contained in the unit ball. As in [7] we
also assume that the origin 0 belongs to co(X ). Note also that the average x¯n of Reality’s
moves always belongs to co(X ) and hence ‖x¯n‖ ≤ 1. In order to be clear, we write out
our game for multivariate linear protocol.
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Bounded Linear Protocol Game in General Dimension
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ H .
Reality announces xn ∈ X .
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn · xn.
END FOR
As a natural multivariate generalization of the strategy Pc given by (1), we consider
the strategy P = PA
Mn = Ax¯n−1Kn−1, (13)
where A is a self-adjoint operator in H . Then A has the spectral resolution
A =
∫ ∞
−∞
λE(dλ), (14)
where E denotes the real spectral measure of A, or the resolution of the identity corre-
sponding to A. Let σ(A) denote the spectrum of A (i.e. the support of E) and let
c0 = inf{λ | λ ∈ σ(A)}, c1 = sup{λ | λ ∈ σ(A)}.
In the finite dimensional case, c0 and c1 correspond to the smallest and the largest eigen-
value of the matrix A, respectively.
Now we have the following generalization of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 5.1 In the bounded linear protocol game in general dimension, if Skeptic uses
the strategy (13) with 0 < c0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1/2. Then lim supnKn = ∞ for each path ξ =
x1x2 . . . of Reality’s moves such that
lim sup
n
√
n‖x¯n‖√
log n
>
√
c1
c0
.
Proof: In the expression
Kn =
n∏
i=1
(1 + Ax¯i−1 · xi), (15)
we have
Ax¯i−1 · xi =
∫ c1
c0
λ(E(dλ)x¯i−1 · xi) = y¯i−1 · yi, (16)
with
y¯i−1 =
∫ c1
c0
√
λE(dλ)x¯i−1, yi =
∫ c1
c0
√
λE(dλ)xi.
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By the Schwarz’s inequality,
|Ax¯n−1 · xi| ≤ ‖y¯i−1‖‖yi‖ ≤ c1‖x¯i−1‖‖xi‖ ≤ 1
2
.
Hence as in (7), we can bound logKn from below as
logKn ≥
n∑
i=1
y¯i−1 · yi − c1
n∑
i=1
‖y¯i−1‖2. (17)
The first term also can be expressed as in (6), and it is bounded from below as follows.
n∑
i=1
y¯i−1 · yi = 1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1‖y¯i‖
2 +
n
2
‖y¯n‖2 − 1
2
(
‖y1‖2 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1‖yi‖
2
)
≥ 1
2
n∑
i=1
‖y¯i‖2 + n
2
‖y¯n‖2 − c1
2
(3 + log(n− 1)). (18)
Combining (17) and (18), we have
logKn ≥
(1
2
− c1
) n∑
i=1
‖y¯i−1‖2 + n
2
‖y¯n‖2 − c1
2
(3 + log(n− 1))
≥ n
2
‖y¯n‖2 − c1
2
(3 + log(n− 1))
≥ n
2
‖y¯n‖2 − c1
2
logn− 3
2
c1
=
c1
2
logn
(
n‖y¯n‖2
c1 log n
− 1
)
− 3
2
c1. (19)
It follows that if lim supn
√
n‖y¯n‖/
√
c1 logn > 1, then lim supn logKn = +∞. Now the
theorem follows from c0‖x¯n‖2 ≤ ‖y¯n‖2. 
Note that
c0‖x¯n‖2 ≤ ‖y¯n‖2 ≤ c1‖x¯n‖2
and the equalities hold if and only if A is a scalar multiplication operator A =
∫∞
−∞
cE(dλ).
Remark 5.1 Suppose that {Am} is a sequence of positive definite degenerate self-adjoint
operators with finite dimensional ranges RAm(H)  RAm+1(H) · · · , and with the supports
(ranges of eigenvalues) σ(Am)  σ(Am+1) · · · ⊂ (0, 1/2]. Also suppose that A∞ is a
compact operator with infinite dimensional range RA∞(H) ⊂ H, and A∞ is obtained in
the limit Am → A∞, m→∞. Then c0(Am)→ c0(A∞) = 0, m→∞, so that in Theorem
5.1,
√
c1(Am)/c0(Am)→
√
c1(A∞)/c0(A∞) =∞, implying that the strategy PA∞ cannot
weakly force SLLN with any rate. This phenomenon reflects one feature that the dimension
of Skeptic’s move space is related to the effective weakly force of his strategy. It is a subject
we will treat in the forthcoming paper.
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A Summary of mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of
Shafer and Vovk (2001)
Here we summarize the mixture ǫ-strategy in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) for
the bounded forecasting game in such a way that its resource requirement (computational
time and memory) becomes explicit.
For a single fixed ǫ-strategy Pǫ, which sets Mn = ǫKn−1, the capital process is given
as KPǫn (x1 . . . xn) =
∏n
i=1(1 + ǫxi). Shafer and Vovk combine Pǫ for many values of ǫ.
Let 1/2 ≥ ǫ1 > ǫ2 > · · · > 0 be a sequence of positive numbers converging to 0. Write
ǫ−k = −ǫk, k = 1, 2, . . . . Furthermore let {pi}i=0,±1,±2,... be a probability distribution on
the set of integers Z, such that p0 = 0 and p−k = pk (symmetric). Actually pk is the initial
amount (out of 1 dollar) put into the account with the strategy Pǫk , k = ±1,±2, . . . . For
example we could take
ǫk =
1
2|k|
, pk =
1
2|k|+1
, k = ±1,±2, . . . , (20)
as is done in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001). However it is more convenient here to
leave ǫk and pk to be general. Then the mixture strategy weakly forcing SLLN is given by
the weighted average of the strategies Pǫk , k = ±1,±2, . . . , with respect to the weights
{pk}k=0,±1,±2,..., namely
P∗ =
∞∑
k=−∞
pkPǫk .
Consider the value M∗n of P∗. It is written as
M∗n =
∞∑
k=−∞
pkǫk
n−1∏
i=1
(1 + ǫkxi).
Now introduce the elementary symmetric functions en,0, en,1, . . . , en,n of the numbers
x1, . . . , xn as
en,0 = 1, en,1 =
n∑
i=1
xi, en,2 =
∑
1≤i<j≤n
xixj , . . . , en,n =
n∏
i=1
xi.
Recall that the set of values {x1, . . . , xn} and the set of values {en,1, . . . , en,n} are in one-
to-one relationship. Therefore computing all the values of the elementary symmetric func-
tions of {x1, . . . , xn} is computationally equivalent to keep all the values of {x1, . . . , xn}.
Using elementary symmetric functions, M∗n is written as
M∗n =
∞∑
k=−∞
pk
n−1∑
i=0
ǫi+1k en−1,i =
n−1∑
i=0
en−1,i
∞∑
k=−∞
pkǫ
i+1
k . (21)
Let F denote the discrete probability distribution on [−1/2, 1/2] with
F ({ǫk}) = pk, k = ±1,±2, . . . ,
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and let
µm = EF (X
m) =
∞∑
k=−∞
pkǫ
m
k =
∫
1/2
−1/2
xmF (dx)
denote the m-th moment of F . Then (21) is written as
M∗n =
n−1∑
i=0
µi+1en−1,i. (22)
At this point it becomes clear that we can take an arbitrary probability distribution
F on [−1/2, 1/2] provided that F is not degenerate at 0 and 0 is the point of support,
i.e., for all ǫ > 0
F (ǫ)− F (−ǫ) > 0.
M∗n in (22) for such an F is a strategy weakly forcing SLLN. Now the simplest F seems
to be the uniform distribution on [−1/2, 1/2]. Actually (20) is in a sense close to the
uniform distribution. Then
µm =
∫ 1/2
−1/2
xmdx =
{
1
m+1
1
2m
m : even
0 m : odd.
In this case there is virtually no computational resource is needed to compute µm, since it
is explicitly given. Furthermore the strategy weakly forcing SLLN based on the uniform
distribution is given by
M∗n =
n−1∑
i=0
i:odd
1
i+ 2
1
2i+1
en−1,i.
In order to compute the M∗n we need all the values of the elementary symmetric functions
en−1,i, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, which is equivalent to keeping all the values of {x1, . . . , xn−1} as
discussed above. Therefore the mixture ǫ-strategy needs a memory of size proportional
to n at time n, whereas our strategy in (1) only needs to keep track of the values of x¯n−1
and Kn−1.
References
[1] Kazuoki Azuma. Weighted sums of certain dependent random variables. Toˆhoku
Math. Journ., 19, 357–367. 1967.
[2] George Bennett. Probability inequalities for the sum of independent random vari-
ables. Journal of American Statistical Association, 57, 33–45, 1962.
[3] Amir Dembo and Ofer Zeitouni. Large Deviations Techniques and Applications. 2nd
ed., Springer, New York, 1998.
13
[4] Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58, 13–30, 1963.
[5] Masayuki Kumon, Akimichi Takemura and Kei Takeuchi. Capital process and opti-
mality properties of Bayesian Skeptic in the fair and biased coin games. Technical
Report METR 05-32 University of Tokyo, 2005. Submitted for publication. (Available
from http://arxiv.org/abs/math.ST/0510662)
[6] Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk. Probability and Finance: It’s Only a Game!.Wiley,
New York, 2001.
[7] Akimichi Takemura and Taiji Suzuki. Game theoretic derivation of dis-
crete distributions and discrete pricing formulas. Technical Report METR 05-
25 University of Tokyo, 2005. Submitted for publication. (Available from
http://arxiv.org/abs/math.PR/0509367)
[8] Kei Takeuchi. Kake no suuri to kinyu kogaku (Mathematics of betting and financial
engineering). Saiensusha, Tokyo, 2004. (in Japanese)
[9] Kei Takeuchi. On strategies in favourable betting games. 2004. Unpublished
manuscript.
[10] Vladimir Vovk, Alex Gammerman, and Glenn Shafer. Algorithmic Learning in a
Random World, Springer, New York, 2005.
[11] Vladimir Vovk, Akimichi Takemura, and Glenn Shafer. Defensive forecasting. in Pro-
ceedings of the tenth international workshop on artificial intelligence and statistics.
R.G.Cowell and Z.Ghahramani editors, 365–372, 2005. (Available electronically at
http://www.gatsby.ucl.ac.uk/aistats/)
[12] Vladimir Vovk, Ilia Nouretdinov, Akimichi Takemura, and Glenn Shafer. Defensive
forecasting for linear protocols. in Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Confer-
ence on Algorithmic Learning Theory (ed. by Sanjay Jain, Hans Ulrich Simon, and
Etsuji Tomita), LNAI 3734, Springer, Berlin, 459–473, 2005.
14
